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In a recent issue of the Haroard Law Review, Professors Daniel Seidmann 
and Alex Stein argue that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self­
incrimination helps innocent defendants. It does so, they contend, by 
encouraging guilty defendants to remain silent instead of concocting false 
alibis. Because juries know that guilty defendants will remain silent, 
Seidmann and Stein claim, j uries will believe the alibis of innocent 
defendants at trial .  Their argument rests on a game-theoretic account of 
how rational defendants should act during interrogation to maximize their 
chances of success at trial . 1 
Seidmann and Stein's elegant game-theoretic construct avails them 
little, however, because their premises, methodology, and conclusion do not 
mirror reality. Though their theory predicts that rational suspects will 
remain silent, roughly eighty to ninety percent of suspects talk to the police.2 
Seidmann and Stein acknowledge this fact but dismiss it as irrational 
behavior, because in their view rational suspects would remain silent in 
preparation for trial.:1 They succumb to the temptation to ignore messy facts 
* Associate Professor, UniYersity of Iowa College of La\,·; former Assistam U.S. Attorney, 
Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I am grateful to Mark Harris, 
K}TOn Huigens, and Dan Richman for their comments on an earlier draft. 
l. Daniel]. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence HeljJs the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic 
Analysis of the Fifth Amenrl1nmt PJivilPge, 114 H.\R\'. L REV. 430 (2000). 
2. /d. at 448 n.60 (acknowledging that somewhere between 9.5% and 20.88% of suspects 
invoke the right to remain silent); infra note 23 (collecting statistics). 
3. Seidmann & Stein, sujmt note 1, at 447-48 & n.60. 
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that do not fit their neat theoretical m odel .  They, like m ost criminal 
procedure scholars, mistakenly view trials as the center of the universe and 
assume that rational suspects should care mainly about m aximizing their 
chances of success at trial.4 This academic obsession with trials bears little. 
relationship to the real world,  _
where only about 6% of felony defendants go 
to trial and most plead guilty." We live in a world of guilty pleas, not trials, 
and in this world suspects have many options more desirable than fighting 
the government's case at trial. Suspects who think that they can divert 
suspicion may throw off the scent by concocting alibis. Those who expect to 
be convicted can earn favorable plea bargains by confessing early and 
perhaps doing undercover work against their co-conspirators . For most 
suspects, these other options are m ore attractive than remaining silent and 
gambling everything on a small chance of acquittal at trial .  
In short, Seidmann and Stein err in viewing interrogation as a mere 
prelude to the inevitable trial and focusing on the latter. Instead, I will focus 
on the interrogation in its own right and the two options that Seidmann and 
Stein dismiss as irrational. Part I analyzes what happens if guilty suspects _ · 
confess the truth . It shows that confessing brings psychic benefits, reductions · 
in charges and sentences, and swift resolutions. Hence, many rational 
suspects do confess instead of remaining silent. Part II looks at the many 
suspects who lie under questioning and shows that lying is often a rational 
response. ·when lies succeed, the payoff of diverting investigators' suspicions 
is enormous. Because of this incentive, many suspects currently lie. They 
thereby pool with innocent suspects and prevent innocent defendants ' alibis 
from being taken at face value, undercutting Seidmann and Stein' s  claim to 
the contrary. In short, Seidmann and Stein's  model does not track observed 
real-world outcomes because it ignores many alternatives that are preferable 
to fighting the government at trial. They rely on an overly theoretical 
methodology and incorrect assumptions about the costs and benefits of 
confessing. As a result, they conclude that guilty defendants will remain 
silent, when in fact most defendants talk. Seidmann and Stein' s  theoretical 
approach typifies criminal procedure's  broader, outmoded preoccupation 
with trials and its failure to focus on the real world. 
-t. /rl. at 442-47 (discussing at length ho1,· damaging at trial silence would be, how triers 
of f�1ct 1\·ould interpret iL. and how it would affect a suspect's entire trial strategy). 
:J. See BL-REAI.' OF jt'ST!CE ST.-\TISTICS, L'.S. DEP'T OF jL:STICE, SOLRC:EBOOK OF CRI�II'\;.-\L 
JLSTICE ST->.TISTICS 1999, at 460 tbl.5.b2 (reponing that a 1996 sun-ey of the seven c:·-five largest 
urban counties in Amerie<t found that only l% of state felony defendants 1vere acquitted after 
trial, 5% \\·ere comicted at trial, the cases of �9% were dismissed, and 66% pleaded guilty (the 
tutals do not add up to 100% because of rounding)); irl. at '132 tbl.S.32 (reporting that in 1999 
only 1.4% of federal felony defendants were acquitted after trial, 4.3% were com1cted after 
trial, the cases of 10.4% ,,·ere dismissed, ancl83.9% pleaded guilty or nolo contendere). 
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I .  To TELL THE TRUTH 
Traditional analyses of the right to remain silent, Seidmann and Stein 
note, take a moral and philosophical approac h .  Traditional analyses assume 
that the right protects guilty defendants ' privacy and liberties at the expense 
of efficient crime control; they then debate the pros and cons of protecting 
guilty defendants.
!i Seidmann and Stein question the conventional 
assumption that the right helps only guilty defendants. They reject empirical 
analvsis of this question because little evidence is available and because 
futu�e criminals may not behave the way past ones have.7 
Instead, Seidmann and Stein construct a game-theoretical behavioral 
model of how rational guilty and innocent defendants would react to 
questioning. As they put it, only "a relatively h igh level of [theoretical] 
abstraction" can produce a determinate explanation of how suspects 
behave.8 They suppose that interrogated guilty suspects have two basic 
choices. First, suspects may choose to remain silent, which leads police to 
assume that they are guilty and focus their investigations on confirming their 
guilt. The right to remain silent prevents juries from inferring guilt based on 
silence; othenvise, guilty suspects would have to concoct lies to avoid adverse 
jury inferences. Second, suspects may lie and c oncoct false alibis. Lies, if 
believed, may throw the police off the scent, but if police disprove lies, trial 
juries will be more likely to convict the lying suspects . Seidmann and Stein 
conclude that silence is often the optimal ch oice for guilty suspects ifjuries 
are forbidden to infer guilt from defendants ' silence.9 Thus, they reason, 
guilty suspects will remain silent while innocent suspects will exculpate 
themselves.1° Knowing that guilty defendants will remain silent, they argue, 
juries and police can trust innocent defendants' truthful alibis and therefore 
will free them. 11 
Seidmann and Stein focus on only two options that guilty suspects have: 
they can lie or remain silent. But suspects have a third option, namely telling 
the truth. Seidmann and Stein dismiss this option as irrational. They believe 
that "[a] typical suspect confesses to a crime only when confronted with 
evidence that he believes to be i rrefutable or when offered a tempting deal 
by the police or the prosecution."1� Furthermore, they claim, "in most 
criminal cases, the premium for confession is negligible."I:l By this logic, few 
6. Seiclmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 434-36. 
7. !d. at 436-37. 
8. !d. at '157-38. 
9. !d. at 466-70. 
10. !d. at 445-48. 
11. Seidmann & Stein, Slljna note 1, at 433-34,457-61,468-70. 
12. ld.at450-51. 
13. !d. at 466; see a/.so id. at 469 (stating that those who confess "enjoy [a] small but positive 
remission of sentence"); irl. at 470 (making explicit the "assumption that confessions secure" 
not large reductions in sentence but only ''small" ones). 
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guilty suspects should ever confess, because confessing will only hurt 
cases at trial. 
Unfortunately, this theory does not fit the facts. Many suspects, when 
questioned, do admit their guilt. One recent study showed that more than 
42% of questioned suspects incriminate themselves.14 Other studies have 
found that between 32% and 67% of those questioned incriminate 
themselves.15 Seidmann and Stein's theoretical model simply does not· 
account for the real world. 
Why do guilty suspects confess? The many suspects who know that they, 
will be convicted in any event gain important benefits from early.
· 
confessions. First, guilty suspects gain important psychic benefits by 
confessing and expressing contrition and remorse for their wrongs.16 
Second, prosecutors may downgrade or drop charges as a reward for 
sympathetic defendants who confess early. Likewise, courts may show extra 1 
mercy at sentencing to those who confess and attempt to help the
· 
government early on.17 And early confessions resolve cases m ore quickly. By 
confessing and pleading guilty early, suspects who are detained pending trial 
speed up their post-sentence moves to long-term confinement. Because the 
14. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police lnteiTogation in the 1990s: An Ernpi1ical Study of l1 
the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCU.\ L. REv. 839, 869 tbl.4 (199fi) (reporting the results of an 
empirical study that showed that 42.2% of questioned suspects admit guilt even after Mi.,-anda, 
and that none of this incrimination was the result of locking a suspect into a false alibi). 
15. Richard A. Leo, Inside the lntenogation Room, 86 J. CR!M. L. & CRI:\IINOLOCY 266, 280, 
280 tbl.7 (1996) (reporting the result5 of an empirical study in which 24.18% of those 
questioned made full confessions, 17.58% made partial admissions, and 22.53% made other 
incriminating statement5, for a total of 64.29%, and noting that other studies had reported 
rates of incriminating statements of 32%, 38%,46%,50%,51%, and 67%). 
16. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Cnme, Confession, and the CounseloT-at-Law: Lessons from 
Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 329, 331, 364-67 ( 1998) (noting that confessions may help 
criminal defendants to achieve "forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience" as well as 
peace, joy, and redemption, but that many criminal defense lmvyers ignore clients' desires to 
achieve these goals by confessing); Stephanos Bi bas, Harmonizing Substantive Climinal Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 COR:\ELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming July 2003) (manuscript at 46-69, on file with the Jowa Law Review) (discussing 
how confessions can lead to repentance, catharsis, reform, and forgiveness in defendants, 
victims, and communities and how pleas without confessions short-circuit these processes); see 
also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, j., dissenting) (noting that 
confessions are good not only for society but also for guilt:;- defendants, because confessions are 
virtuous and promote both 'justice and rehabilitation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,538 (1966) (\Vhite,J., dissenting) (noting that confession, far 
from hurting the suspect, "may provide ps;·chological relief and enhance the prospects for 
rehabilitation''). 
17. See U.S. SENTE'.;C!i'\G GL'IDELI:\ES lVL-1.:\L\L� 3£1 1(b), application notes l (h), 6 (2001) 
(making timeliness of confessions a criterion for sentence redttctions); George E. Dix, Promises, 
Confessions, and H'ayne LaFave's Bright Line Rule A na(nis, 1993 U. ILL. L. RE\·. 207, 247 (1993) 
(explaining that sentencing judges may give greater ll'eight to prompt cooperation, as earlier 
cooperation is more likely to lead to additional information in time for officers to use it, 
whereas late cooperation may be redundant once police have developed other sources of 
information independently). 
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used for pretrial detention are often less pleasant than the prisons used 
·for longer-term incarceration, defendants may prefer quick resolutions.
18 
Early confessions bring particular benefits in multi-defendant cases­
g from car-theft rings to fraud conspiracies to robbery gangs to 
drug cartels. For example, a low-level drug courier who is arrested may 
and agree to cooperate in the investigation of her co-conspirators. 
t to make it  work, the courier must admit guilt, and often she must do so 
t away.19 Once she does so, she may be able to deliver the drugs she was 
· g to the intended recipient, giving police surveillance valuable 
evidence and perhaps leading to more arrests. She may also place recorded 
telephone conversations with o thers in the organization. She may even wear 
body recorder and microphone to tape-record meetings in person, acting 
a5 a government informant for some time. All of these activities will earn her 
substantial credit come sentencing time, and they are virtually the only way 
that she can reduce the otherwise stiff drug penalties.
�0 
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L RLBE\, j LDIC:lAL POLICY MAKJ'lG A'lD THE MODERi\ 
.STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFOR\!ED A\!ERICA'S PR!SO:\S 111 (1998); see aLso HU!AN RIGHTS 
WATCH, PRlSG:'.J CO'lDIT!ONS 1:\ THE Ll:\ITED ST.-\TES 18-22 (1991) (noting that some jails are 
overcrowded, and because they are for short-term incarceration they often lack recreation 
facilities, windows, privacy, and classitication of inmates). Large dormitory-style jail cells are 
particularly unpleasant and make it easier for inmates to attack and sodomize each other. ld. at 
26. 
19. See Dix, supm note 17, at 247 ("For a variety of reasons, and perhaps especially in dntg 
cases, officers may be \villing to 'deal' with a suspect only if the suspect is willing to deal 
immediately, with the otlicers, and without consulting counsel or others," because such deals 
are timely, flexible, and preserve contidentiality.); see also jAMES Q. WILSO:\, THE 
. INVESTIGATORS: MAI\AGI:\C F.B.I. ,\ND !\.\RC:OTICS AGEYfS 73-74 (1978) (explaining that the 
hours between arrest and arraignment are the critical time during which agents are best able to 
flip suspects and use them in ongoing investigations). 
The confession is an important prelude to cooperation for three reasons. First, it is 
simply implausible to imagine someone who simultaneously denies guilt while going through 
the motions of continuing to take part in the denied crime. Second, if the courier is denying 
her innocence, she may avoid discussing her incriminating knowledge during taped 
conversations. This would greatly reduce the likelihood that she would elicit incriminating 
statemenl� from others and that she would steer the police towards evidence that incriminates 
others as well as herself. Indeed, her stilted conversations might even tip off her co-conspirators 
that something 11·as \\Tong. Third, confession is central to airing the facts in preparation for 
testimony at trial. Cooperating witnesses must be prepared to testify fully about the crime and 
their roles in it. To demonstrate candor, a IV·itness must come completely clean before the jury. 
The witness is even more credible if she confessed her involvement right awav to the police. 
20. 18 LT.S.C. § 3SS3(e) (2000) (authorizing sentencingjuclges to depart below manclatmv 
minimum sentences for defendants who furnish "substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution" of other criminals, on rnotion of the government); U.S. SE�TE'lC!:\C GUDELI:\ES 
MAJ'iUAL § 5K1.l (200 1) (authorizing departures from federal sentencing guidelines for 
defendants who provide "substantial assistance in the itwestigation or prosecution of' other 
criminals, on motion of the government); Frank 0. Bownan, Ill, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: 
A Year of Judicial RnJOII on "Substantial Assistance" DejJm1urrs Follows a Decade of Prosecuto1ial 
lndiscij;line, 29 STETSO:\ L. RE\'. 7, 14-lS (1999) (explaining that "for most defenclanlo; virtually 
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If instead she remains silent, she loses this chance to cooperate. And if 
she decides to change her mind later, perhaps on an attorney 's  advice, it 
may be too late.  After arrest, she may stay in jail for some time until she is 
arraigned and makes bail (or not). By that time, others may h ave noticed 
her absence, know or suspect that she h as been arrested, and refuse to deal 
wi th her. The scheduled time for delivery of the drugs may long since h ave 
passed, raising suspicions and thwarting plans for a controlled delivery 
under police surveillance. Or the government may no longer want her help, 
having found a more cooperative courier or other sources of information in 
the meantime.21 In the fast-paced world of investigation and cooperation, 
she who hesitates is lost. 
Seidmann and Stein's  theoretical model does not reflect these 
substantial benefits of confessions in its factual assumptions. Nor do 
Seidmann and Stein adjust their model to account for the observed facts: 
widespread confessions, cooperation, and guilty pleas . The point is that 
many suspects who can expect to be found guilty confess because they know 
that going to trial, let alone winning at trial , is not realistic. They 
understandably prefer the bird in the h and (the benefits of confession) to 
the bird in the bush (a slim chance of an acquittal at trial). Suspects are too 
savvy to pin all their h opes on trials that exist only in theory. 
II. GUlL TY SUSPECTS LIE 
Suppose that telling the truth is not an attractive option, perhaps 
because the evidence of guilt is shaky. The suspect can choose to lie or to 
remain silent . Despite the right to remain silent,  a plurality of suspects 
choose to lie. As Seidmann and Stein acknowledge, "suspects do not exercise 
the right to silence very often either at interrogation or at trial. ,n The data 
they c ite show that roughly 80% to 90% of questioned suspects do not 
invoke the right to silence.23 Other data indicate that lvfimnda warnings and 
the right to silence reduce confessions by between 4% and 16%.2•1 Roughly 
46% of questioned suspects deny guil t, almost four times as many as remain 
silent.2' Unless the police are formally interrogating huge numbers of 
innocent suspects , one must conclude that guilty suspects prefer lies to 
the only ground on which a departure from these stiff sentences might plausibly be based is 
'substantial assistance' to the government"). 
21. See Dix, supra note 17, at 247. 
22. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 448. 
23. Cassell & Ha)man, sujJra note 14, at 869 tbl. 4 (reporting results of empirical study 
showing that only 12.1% of suspects questioned invoked their (Vfiranda rights); Leo, supra note 
15, at 275 tbl.2 (reporting results of an empirical study showing that only 20.88% of suspects 
invoked Aliranda rights). 
24. Seidmann & Stein, sujJra note l, at 500-01 (collecting statistics). 
25. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 14, at 869 tbl.4 (reporting that 45.7% of suspects 
questioned denied guilt or made other non-incriminating statements). 
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silence. Some suspects remain silent, indicating that silence 1s at times 
advantageous, but many more find it beneficial to lie. 
Seidmann and Stein acknowledge that guilty suspects h ave incentives to 
lie. If the police believe the lie, the suspect may divert police attention to 
other suspects. They may also release the suspect from custody. The suspect 
can then set up an alibi, destroy incriminating evidence, or intimidate 
potential witnesses.26 The suspect can even flee the jurisdiction. Conversely, 
if the suspect remains silent, the police and prosecution will infer his guilt 
and focus on developing evidence against him.27 In other words, lies may 
throw police off the scent, whereas silence will convince them of guilt .  
Despite these compelling incentives to lie and the revealed preferences 
of suspects, Seidmann and Stein do not modify their theory to fit the 
observed facts . Instead, they maintain that "silence is usually the better 
choice ."28 They reason that while silence causes pretrial damage, this 
damage is much less serious than the damage a false alibi will likely cause at 
trial .29 They argue that m ost suspects act irrationally in talking to the police 
because they irrationally underestimate the likelihood of h arm at trial. 30 
Seidmann and Stein are inconsistent. Their assertion of irrationality 
conflicts with their overall "rationalist approach" and their treatment of 
rationality as "the norm."31 If 80% to 90% of suspects are behaving 
irrationally, not much is left of Seidmann and Stein's  elegant theoretical 
rational-actor model . Or perhaps it is Seidmann and Stein who are being 
irrational. The revealed preferences of the 80% to 90% who do not remain 
silent belie Seidmann and Stein's bare assertion of irrationality. Most of 
these 80% to 90% are street-savvy, experienced recidivists who know how the 
criminal justice system works.32 Their behavior should make us question 
whether lying to the police is such an irrational move after all. 
Indeed, lying to the police is often rational. The flaw in Seidmann and 
Stein' s  theoretical model is their assumption that pretrial investigations are 
much less important than trials. As a rule, cases are won or lost during the 
investigation stage. A credible lie may divert police suspicion during an 
investigation and free the suspect from jail immediately. If the suspect does 
26. Seidmann & Stein, supra note l ,  at 447. 
27. ld. at 444, 446. 
28. !d. at 448. 
29. ld. at 447-48. 
30. ld. at 448. 
3 1. Seidmann & Stein, sujna note 1, at 450. 
32. See Leo, supra note 15, at 275 (noting that 58% of those questioned had felony 
records, 29% had misdemeanor records, and 13% had no records); cf id. at 287 tbl.9 (noting 
that 69.90% of those with felony records, 89.36% of those with misdemeanor records, and 
91.67% of those with no criminal records waived their Mi·randa rights). While experience \\�th 
the criminal justice system does reduce the percentage of suspects who speak to the police 
somewhat, a solid majority of the most experienced criminals still think it is in their interests to 
speak. 
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not divert suspicion, however, the investigation is likely to be the end of the 
story. Police assume that suspects remain silent because they are guilty and 
cannot exculpate themselves, in contrast to the many defendants who 
already proffer alibis. Police and prosecutors have strong incentives and 
pressures to secure large numbers of convictions. So, once a suspect remains 
silent and thereby confirms the police's suspicion that he is guilty, police use 
many tools to find more proof of guilt. The police can conduct surveillance 
of every move he makes. They can show him to witnesses in line-ups or 
photographic arrays. They can target his friends and associates and pressure 
them to give evidence against him. Prosecutors can subpoena his telephone 
records, bank statements, and credit card bills for evidence. They can keep 
track of the telephone numbers he calls and the mail he receives, and can 
perhaps wiretap telephones to record incriminating conversations. In short, 
once the government focuses on a target, it can often build an 
overwhelming case. This helps to explain why only about 1% of felony 
defendants are acquitted at trial; most plead guilty.33 Most suspects are right 
not to worry about damaging their cases at trial, because their chances of 
going to trial and winning are so small. 
Put another way, Seidmann and Stein's claim is that the right induces 
guilty suspects to remain silent, because they know that juries will not infer 
guilt from silence (though police will). Without a right to remain silent, they 
claim, guilty suspects would concoct (credible) false alibis, leading juries to 
discount innocent suspects' alibis.
34 
But why would those who could concoct 
credible alibis refrain from doing so, if alibis are so rarely refuted (as argued 
below)? The argument further supposes that guilty suspects care most about 
maximizing their chances of winning at trial, when in fact trials are rare and 
guilty suspects know it. Because trials are won or lost at the investigative 
stage, few cases are worth pushing to a trial where the no-adverse-inference 
rule might make a difference. Seidmann and Stein's entire argument hinges 
on the inferences that juries might draw at trial, when in 94% of cases there 
will never be a trial. 
vVhile silence is often not as attractive an option as Seidmann and Stein 
33. See supra note 5 (collecting statistics). While it is true that a fraction of cases is 
dismissed, the possibility of dismissal is hardly a reason for suspects to remain silent instead of 
lying. First, on Seidmann and Stein's model, the right to remain silent confers an added benefit 
only at trial, by preventingjuries from drawing ach·erse inferences. Before trial. police and other 
actors are free to draw adverse inferences from suspects' silence, regardless of 1\'hether there is 
a right to remain silent. If the case never makes it w trial, there is no jur)' to draw an adYerse 
inference, and the right has no effect. Thus, the right protects guilry suspects only in the fewer 
than 6% of cases that go to trial; it has no effect on dismissals. Second. as the text goes on w 
note, false alibis in practice do not come back to haunt suspects. If anything, plausible lies are 
more likely to lead the government not to charge or to dismiss cases \\'here guilt is doubtful. In 
contrast, silence would only conlirm the defendant's guilt and steel the goYernment's 
determination to convict. 
34. Seidmann & Stein, sujnn note 1, at 465-70. 
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make it out to be, lies are even more attractive than they suggest. Lies are 
not nearly as damaging as Seidmann and Stein assume, because they are 
unlikely to be disproved. A recent empirical study found that while 79 out of 
173 interrogated suspects made non-incriminating statements, not a single 
suspect was locked into a demonstrably false alibi.35 Once again, Seidmann 
and Stein fail to modify their theory to reflect these facts. 
Suspects in white-collar crimes have particular reasons to lie instead of 
remaining silent in anticipation of trial. For reputable business executives 
and professionals, merely being indicted is enough to besmirch their 
reputations and harm their livelihoods.
36 
Avoiding indictment is the name of 
the game, and they will do whatever it takes-either telling the truth and 
making a quick deal or lying to divert suspicion. Silence is often the absolute 
worst option, as it \vill lead not only to indictment but also to search warrants 
and subpoenas. This further investigation will almost certainly turn up 
incriminating evidence, because white-collar cases turn on business records 
and paper trails. :17 
True, lying has its risks. The police may be able to disprove lies, 
especially grandiose alibis, which vvill hurt the suspect. As noted, however, 
this outcome is not nearly as common as Seidmann and Stein suppose. 
Seidmann and Stein use a hypothetical example in which an eyewitness 
remembers seeing the suspect at some time, but is confused about whether 
it was at the crime scene or on another occasion. To counter this 
identification evidence, the guilty suspect can guess at another, innocent 
occasion on which the witness says she might have seen the suspect. The 
suspect's only alternatives are to guess at the alternative possibility voiced by 
the witness, or else stay silent.
'1K 
Seidmann and Stein's hypothetical is far-fetched. Most lies are much 
more mundane and general, such as: "I didn't do it. I have no idea what 
you're talking about. I've never seen that guy before." The government 
cannot use this lie against the defendant, because it is impossible to prove its 
falsehood without independently adducing sufficient evidence of guilt. Or 
the lie may be specific, as where a suspect counts on his mother or girlfriend 
to say he was at home during the crime. Granted, the lie may not work, as 
the police are skeptical of self-serving statements. But the payoff for a 
successful lie is high and the downside is low. Given the low rates of acquittal 
and the massive benefits for pleading guilty, going to trial usually is not a 
35. Cassell & Hannan. sufmt note 14, at 869 tb1.4. 
36. SeP Pamela H. Bucy, \-\7Jite Collar Crime and the Role of Defense Counsel, 50 ALA. LA\N. 226, 
228 (1989) (explaining that the very returning of indictments hurts white-collar defendants, 
even if thev are later acquitted, because indictments cloud professional reputations, alert 
potential civil plaintiffs to possi ble improprieties, and subject defendants to financial and 
emotional stress). 
37. Seeid.at231. 
38. Seiclmann & Stein, supra note l, at 462-64. 
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realistic option.39 Thus, suspects do not care much about how lies might 
hurt them at trial. Most suspects have only two real options: either deflect 
suspicion by lying or plead guilty. In short, lying is an entirely rati 
gamble for many, many suspects. A few who cannot concoct good lies wiij 
remain silent, but this modest amount of silence is not enough to lead juries 
to trust all alibis. 
Moreover, Seidmann and Stein divide cases into three 
compartments: those with strong, intermediate, and weak evidence. They 
then reason about whether guilty and innocent suspects are better off 
remaining silent or protesting their innocence in each type of trial.40 
trial-focused approach is unrealistic. Sometimes, interrogators \vill confront 
a suspect with overwhelming incriminating evidence or arrest her 
handed. Very often, however, suspects must decide whether to speak long 
before they know the evidence against them,41 or in the face of bluffing by 
interrogators. Suspects often do not know as of the time of the interrogation 
whether the evidence will be strong, intermediate, or weak if and when the·' 
case gets to trial. Thus, they cannot make the detailed trial forecasts that · 
Seidmann and Stein expect them to make. What they do know is that an · 
immediate lie can throw the police off the scent, and in practice many use_:· ·  
this option. 
Seidmann and Stein's entire argument depends on the premise that.. 
"many guilty suspects opt for silence instead of lies," so that juries will
· 
' � 0 ' 
assume that those who talk are tellmg the truth. - But m a world where few 
defendants find it advantageous to press on to jury trials, convincing the 
police matters far more than convincing the jury. This explains why 80% to . 
90% talk. And in a world where 80% to 90% of suspects talk, talk is cheap. 
Some guilty suspects choose to remain silent, but many more talk, 
mimicking innocent defendants and so leading juries and police to distrust: 
all alibis. 
� 
The 10% to 20% of suspects who remain silent may benefit from the 
right to silence, but the spillover effect of this silence is negligible. Doubtless . 
some of these silent suspects are guilty. Innocent suspects may also remain 
silent, however, either because they lack strong alibis or because they fear 
39. See supra note 5 (collecting statistics o n  rates of acquittals and c o nvictions at trial ) ;  
Stephanos B ibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a Won',:l of Guilty Pleas, 1 1 0 
YALE L j .  1097,  1 1 50, 1 1 5 3-54 ( 200 1 ) .  
Lies m ight also b e  relevant if they made plea bargains less favorable ( o r  if, conversely, 
s i lence made plea bargains more favorable) . But given that l ies are so rarely disproved, there is 
l i ttle reason to think that they lead to plea bargain s  that are harsh e r  than those fol lowing 
si lence.  
40.  Seidrnann & Ste i n ,  supra note 1 ,  at 467-70. 
41 . See, e.g ,  NJ .  Cr. R. 3 : 1 3-3 ( b )  ( explai ning that discovery is not ordinarily due until 
fourteen days after indictment) . 
42. Seiclmann & Stein ,  supra note 1 ,  at 433. 
THE RIGHT TO REJ\!IAIN SILENT HELPS ONL Y THE GUlL TY 43 1 
police and want lawyers to protect them. Seidmann and Stein do not 
'
consider this possibility, let alone quantify it. Since the pool of silent suspects 
is not large, and some of those silent suspects may be innocent, silence tells 
little about the bulk of suspects who speak. One can draw only the 
weakest of inferences that the 46% of suspects who deny guilt are innocent.
43 
-�, .... uF·r, jurors are never told to trust testifying defendants. Nor will they 
.read the Harvard Law Review and find out that they are supposed to trust 
alibis, at least in cases of intermediate strength. On the contrary, jury -
instrUctions warn them that witnesses, including defendants, may shade 
·their testimony out of bias and interest in the outcome.44 And common 
" sense teaches jurors not to trust self-serving alibis. In sum, when guilty and 
suspects alike talk frequently, jurors can not infer that talk is 
III. CONCLUSION 
Seidmann and Stein's effort to use game theory to model i nterrogation 
is elegant, but it proceeds from abstract premises that are often erroneous or 
· 
·
not nuanced enough. They fail to found it on the real-world experience of 
suspects, police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Rather than adjusting 
their model to fit and account for observed empirical facts, they disregard 
inconvenient data. And their premises, like those of most criminal 
procedure scholarship, are stuck in the mythical world of jury trials. Their 
too-abstract methodology, coupled with flawed premises, leads them to a 
43. See supra note 25 .  If one assumes that si lent suspects are disproportionately guiltv, and 
· ·if one assumes that j urors somehow know this, and if one assumes that lay jurors are aware of 
. and respond to fine gradations i n  pooling phenomena, and ij one assumes that jurors wil l  draw 
inferences in favor of testifyi ng defendants but n o t  adverse i n ferences against silent defendants, 
perhaps a few j urors might theoreti cal ly trust alibis sl ightly more, but any such effect seems 
exceedingly speculative and negligible.  Any such effe c t  is  a far cry from the large, sign ifican t 
effect claimed by Seidman n and Stein. And to the exte n t  that jurors draw favorable i n fe rences 
'; from alibis, they are l i kely to draw correspondingly unfavorable inferences from silence.  This 
would undercut any i n centive to remain si lent and so i nduce si lent suspects to speak, which 
would unravel th e  supposed anti-pooling e ffect. 
44. Seidmann and Stein assume without argument that j uries know they sh o ul d  trust alibis 
because they somehow know that guil ty defendants will remain si lent .  : :;ee Seidmann & Ste in . 
supra note I ,  at 469 (" [T] he j u ry dra\VS a favorable infe rence from anv ex cui patory statement. " ) .  
This assumption does n o t  square with my ovv11 experiences a s  a federal prosecutor. I n  various 
Westlaw searches through the jury-i nstructions database U l-ALL) on October 5 ,  2002, 1 found 
not a single pattern j u ry i nstruction to that effect.  Nor would any j uror with commo n  sense 
assume that a defendant must be tellin g the truth.  On the con trarY , judges i nstruct j u ri es to 
consider a witness's stake in the outcome in decidin g  whether or not to belie,·e that witness's 
testi mony, and some explicitly tell j u rors to j udge defendants' testimony by the same srandarcls. 
COM�!. 0"-i PATTER'< jL'R\" lNSTRLCTIO"iS, D IST. j L'DCES ASS ' '\ Or THE FIHH CIRCL' IT. PATTER'\ 
jURY INSTRLC I I O"'S (Criminal Cases) § 1 .08 (200 1 ) ;  Cm!\1 .  0'\ P -\TTER:--.: .Jn.\· 1:\STRLCTIO'\S, 
DIST. jl'DGES AsS' '<  Or Ti lE SEVENTH CIRCU IT, FEDER:\L CRI\ l i "io\L Jl'R\' 1'\STRLCTI00,"S OF THE 
SEVENTH CIRCL'IT § 1.03 ( 1999) ; COM'vl. 0'\ PATTER'\ jLR\' l'\STRL'CTIOi'\S, DIST . _) L DCES ASS' \!  or 
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERL\ CRI\I l'\AL JL'RY lNSTRL!CTIONS § 7 .02B ( 1991 ) .  
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conclusion at  odds with e mp irical fact.  I h ave written elsewhere about the 
need to move past the outdated fixation on trials . 4'' Seidmann and Stein 's 
article exemplifies this fixation with abstractions and trials .  Instead of 
focusing exclusively on trials, scholars must analyze the myriad other real­
world options that suspects have . Ofte n ,  deflecting suspicion,  cooperating 
with the government, or otherwise striking a favorable plea bargain will be 
much more attractive than trial . Thus ,  many talk and few stay silen t. 
This messy reality lacks the theoretical elegance and beauty of 
Seidmann and Stein's  model. For example ,  i t  requires exploring the 
incentives to confess created by stiff drug sente nces and the Sen te ncing 
Gui delines ' cooperation and acceptance-of-responsibility provisions.  But the 
messy model explains the data much be tter than the e legant  one does. 
Beauty is not always truth , nor tru th , beauty.  It is time to stop assuming that 
every criminal case ends in a j ury trial and to heed fac ts that undercut 
th eories . V\7e must scrutinize how police, prosecutors, defense counsel,  and 
suspects respond to multifarious incentives in  th e real world and tailor our 
th eories to fit these facts. 
45.  Sn: Ribas, s ujHa n o t e  39. 
